THE BUSINESS OF WAR: A STUDY ON THE THREAT PERCEPTION MECHANISM OF THE EUROPEAN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Keywords:
Europe, Military-industrial complex, Threat perception, Defense spendingAbstract
European defense spending has risen significantly, particularly since the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This study investigates the role of the military-industrial complex in this trend. Using data from 2010-2022, it finds that the military-industrial complex influences threat perception and defense spending. It exaggerates external threats, creating a security agenda that benefits its own interests. Countries with greater military-industrial complex influence exhibit higher threat perception and increased defense spending. This "creating demand" logic differs from traditional arms procurement and highlights the military-industrial complex's agency in shaping the security agenda. Countries should be vigilant about the influence of military-industrial interest groups on defense policies to avoid over-allocation of defense resources due to manipulated threat perceptions.References
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