Author(s)

XinMiao Huang

Affiliation(s)

Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing 100089, China.

Corresponding Author

XinMiao Huang

ABSTRACT

This study examines the relationship between clientelism and political corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries following democratic transitions. Using data from the V-Dem project, the paper conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of corruption on clientelism and its mechanisms from 1990 to 2020 across countries in this region. The findings reveal that frequent corruption tends to escalate levels of clientelism; Mechanism analysis indicates that corruption undermines the legitimacy of political regimes, prompting politicians to rely on patronage to secure electoral support; In countries with lower levels of development, corruption further hinders economic growth, fostering conditions conducive to the proliferation of nepotism. These conclusions offer policy insights for emerging democracies to effectively address clientelism, enhance governance capacity, and promote democratic consolidation.

KEYWORDS

Clientelism; Corruption; Democratization; Legitimacy

CITE THIS PAPER

XinMiao Huang. Patronage and corruption in post-democratic transition: empirical analysis from Sub-Saharan African countries. Journal of Political Science and International Relations Studies. 2025, 2(1): 15-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.61784/jpsr3009.

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