Author(s)

Miao Wang^1,2,*

Affiliation(s)

¹Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, Heilongjiang, China.

²School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, Heilongjiang, China.

Corresponding Author

Miao Wang

ABSTRACT

European defense spending has risen significantly, particularly since the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This study investigates the role of the military-industrial complex in this trend. Using data from 2010-2022, it finds that the military-industrial complex influences threat perception and defense spending. It exaggerates external threats, creating a security agenda that benefits its own interests. Countries with greater military-industrial complex influence exhibit higher threat perception and increased defense spending. This "creating demand" logic differs from traditional arms procurement and highlights the military-industrial complex's agency in shaping the security agenda. Countries should be vigilant about the influence of military-industrial interest groups on defense policies to avoid over-allocation of defense resources due to manipulated threat perceptions.

KEYWORDS

Europe; Military-industrial complex; Threat perception; Defense spending

CITE THIS PAPER

Miao Wang. The business of war: a study on the threat perception mechanism of the European military-industrial complex. Eurasia Journal of Science and Technology. 2024, 6(3): 30-34. DOI: 10.61784/ejst3012.

REFERENCES

[1] Robinson N. Videogames, persuasion and the war on terror: escaping or embedding the military—entertainment complex?. Political Studies, 2012, 60(3), 504-522.

[2] Nordhaus WD, Oneal JR, Russett B. The effects of the international security environment on national military expenditures: a multicountry study. International Organization, 2012, 66(3), 491-513.

[3] National Archives. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address, 1961.

[4] Rosen S. Testing the theory of the military-industrial complex. Lexington Books, 1973.

[5] Melman S. The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline. Simon and Schuster, 1976.

[6] Giroux HA. The University in Chains: Confronting the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex. Routledge, 2007.

[7] Lai B. Slater D. Institutions of the offensive: domestic sources of dispute initiation in authoritarian regimes, 1950–1992. American Journal of Political Science, 2005, 50(1), 113-126.

[8] Whitten GD, Williams LK. Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of Defence Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 2010, 55(1), 117-134.

[9] Elveren AY, Hsu S. Military expenditures and profit rates: evidence from oecd countries. Metroeconomica, 2015, 67(3), 551-577.

[10] Eichenberg RC, Stoll RJ. Representing defense. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2003, 47(4), 399-422.

[11] Koenig T, Troeger VE. Budgetary politics and veto players. Swiss Political Science Review, 2005, 11(4), 47-75.

[12] Cornish P, Edwards G. Beyond the eu/nato dichotomy: the beginnings of a european strategic culture. International Affairs, 2001, 77(3), 587-603.

[13] Fordham BO. The politics of threat perception and the use of force: a political economy model of u.s. uses of force, 1949-1994. International Studies Quarterly, 1998, 42(3), 567-590.

[14] Sinkkonen E, Elovainio M. Chinese perceptions of threats from the united states and japan. Political Psychology, 2019, 41(2), 265-282.

[15] Oliveira T, Martin MFO. Understanding e‐business adoption across industries in european countries. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 2010, 110(9), 1337-1354.

[16] Vroege B. Strategic Autonomy in Military Production: The EDF and the Constitutional Limits to EU Defence-Industrial Spending Power. European Foreign Affairs Review, 2023, 28(4), 341-362.

[17] Smith KE, Fooks G, Gilmore A, Collin J, Weishaar H. Corporate coalitions and policy making in the european union: how and why british american tobacco promoted “better regulation”. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 2015, 40(2), 325-372.

[18] MacLeavy J, Peoples C. Workfare–warfare: neoliberalism, “active” welfare and the new american way of war. Antipode, 2009, 41(5), 890-915.

[19] Feaver PD. Civil-military relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 1999, 2(1), 211-241.

[20] Izadi R. State security or exploitation: a theory of military involvement in the economy. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2022, 66(4-5), 729-754.

[21] Yilmaz A. The missing piece of the puzzle: the emasya protocol and civil-military relations in turkey. Armed Forces & Society, 2022, 49(2), 470-488.

[22] ?eng?z M. An Examination Of The National Security Paradigms Within The International Relations Discipline As On And Post-Cold War. Mecmua, 2022, 14, 182-198.

[23] Huddy L, Feldman S, Capelos T, et al. The consequences of terrorism: disentangling the effects of personal and national threat. Political Psychology, 2002, 23(3), 485-509.

[24] Ledbetter J. Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex. Yale University Press, 2011.

[25] Kne?evi? S, Obradovi? T, Milojevi? S. Managing the risk of corruption in the defense sector. Revizor, 2022, 25(99)

[26] Koroschupov VO. Some Aspects of European Defence Industry Development. World Economy and International Relations, 2022, 66(12), 87-107.

[27] Rufanges JC. The Arms Industry Lobby in Europe. American Behavioral Scientist, 2016, 60(3), 305-320.

[28] Mylonas Y. Discourses of counter-Islamic-threat mobilization in post 9/11 documentaries. Journal of Language and Politics, 2012, 11(3), 405-426.

[29] Aslam R. (2007). Measuring the peace dividend: evidence from developing economies. Defence and Peace Economics, 18(1), 39-52.

[30] Chen B, Li-ming Z. The determinants of china's defense expenditure before and after transition. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2006, 23(3), 227-244.

[31] Konovalova М, Abuzov A. Geopolitical crises, the energy sector, and the financial capital market. E3S Web of Conferences, 2023, 381(01042), 1-7.

[32] Ghazanfar B, Khalid I, Qazi SM. Paradigm shifts in strategic culture of pakistan: an assessment of traditional versus non-traditional threat perceptions. Annals of Human and Social Sciences, 2022, 3(2).

[33] Ge?ien?-Janulion? I. The consequences of perceived (in)security and possible coping strategies of lithuanian people in the context of external military threats. Journal on Baltic Security, 2018, 4(1), 5-14.

[34] Bachleitner K. International memories in global politics: making the case for or against un intervention in libya and syria. Review of International Studies, 2023, 50(2), 271-288.

[35] Cohen D. Culture, social organization, and patterns of violence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1998, 75(2), 408-419.

[36] Liu D, Wang C, Fang C, Liu P. A study of project financing on the defense industry in systems thinking perspective. Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, 2021, 11(2), 131-149.

[37] Albareda A, Braun C. Organizing transmission belts: the effect of organizational design on interest group access to eu policy‐making. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 2019, 57(3), 468-485.

[38] Shrestha YR, Ben-Menahem SM, Krogh GV. Organizational decision-making structures in the age of artificial intelligence. California Management Review, 2019, 61(4), 66-83.

[39] Hostert P, Kuemmerle T, Prishchepov AV, et al. Rapid land use change after socio-economic disturbances: the collapse of the soviet union versus chernobyl. Environmental Research Letters, 2011, 6(4), 045201.

[40] Moses IK. The reconstruction of nato in the post trump era. Journal of Advanced Research and Multidisciplinary Studies, 2021, 1(2), 10-17.

[41] Malizard J. Military expenditure and economic growth in the european union: evidence from sipri’s extended dataset. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2016, 11(2).

[42] Flores AQ. Alliances as contiguity in spatial models of military expenditures. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2011, 28(4), 402-418.

[43] Khaustova VY, Kyzym M, Kostenko DM. Analyzing the International Assessments of the Military Power of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Countries of the World. Business Inform, 2023, 541, 16-33.  

[44] Syzov A, Koval O, Pakholchuk V. Military power and militarization of global space. Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Military-Special Sciences, 2022, 51(3), 49-55.

[45] Ye?ilyurt ME, Elhorst JP. (). Impacts of neighboring countries on military expenditures: A dynamic spatial panel approach. Journal of Peace Research, 2017, 54(6), 777-790.

[46] Kollias C. Country survey military expenditure in Cyprus. Defence and Peace Economics, 2001, 12(6), 589-607.

[47] Aizenman J, Glick R. Military expenditure, threats, and growth. NBER Working Paper Series, 2003, 9618.

[48] Morgan TC, Bapat N, Kobayashi Y. Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2014, 31(5), 1-18.

[49] Akoto W, Peterson TM, Thies CG. Trade composition and acquiescence to sanction threats. Political Research Quarterly, 2019, 73(3), 526-539.

[50] Peterson TM, Venteicher JF. Trade relationships and asymmetric crisis perception. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2012, 9(2), 223-239.

[51] Stavrianakis A. Introducing the special section on ‘arms export controls during war and armed conflict’. Global Policy, 2023, 14(1), 107-111.

[52] Geyer M. Arms Exports: The Normality of a Scandalous Subject: A Comment. German Yearbook of Contemporary History, 2022, 6.

[53] Chopra A. China's Rise as an Arms Exporter: Implications for India. Claws Journal, 2020, 13(2), 81-96.

[54] Blum J. Arms production, national defense spending and arms trade: examining supply and demand. European Journal of Political Economy, 2019, 60, 101814.

[55] Haesebrouck T. Who follows whom? a coincidence analysis of military action, public opinion and threats. Journal of Peace Research, 2019, 56(6), 753-766.

[56] Moon C, Lee S. Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula. Asian Perspective, 2009, 33(4).

[57] Collier P, Hoeffler A. Military expenditure - threats, aid, and arms races. Policy Research Working Papers, 2002. 

[58] Pamp O, Thurner PW. Trading Arms and the Demand for Military Expenditures: Empirical Explorations Using New SIPRI-Data. Defence and Peace Economics, 2017, 28(4), 457-472.

[59] Belin J, et al. Defence industrial links between the EU and the US. Armament Industry European Research Group, 2017.

[60] Ministère des Armées. Loi de programmation militaire 2019-2025, 2018.

[61] Cabinet of Germany. Speech by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag, at the Munich Security Conference, 2022. 

[62] Website of the Republic of Poland. Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, 2022.

[63] Terlikowski M. Defence Innovation: New Models and Procurement Implications. The Polish Case. Armament Industry European Research Group, 2022.

[64] Fajnor J. Government endorsed donation of military materiel from Czech defence industries. Ministry of Defence & Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, 2022.