Author(s)

YanRunYu Liang, ShiYu Xie^*

Affiliation(s)

School of Elderly Care Services and Management, Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine, Nanjing 210023, Jiangsu, China.

Corresponding Author

ShiYu Xie

ABSTRACT

Chinese administration exhibits a tension between inherent contradictions and effective management. When policy goals are rigid, as seen in COVID-19 prevention, local authorities often cannot rely on 'muddling through' strategies and must adopt campaign-style responses. However, cities like Shanghai developed precise, multi-target prevention models. This paper uses a framework of task attributes and management habits to analyze these differences across selected cities, finding that management habits are crucial in shaping responses when flexibility is limited. Localities with high specialization, autonomy, and coordination capacity tend to employ delegated management, balancing "political and professional responsibilities" to create targeted prevention mechanisms. In contrast, other areas resort to direct command and layered campaign-style responses. Overall, China's epidemic prevention reflects a feedback-adjustment process between central policy goals and local implementation outcomes.

KEYWORDS

Management model; Task difficulty; Management habits; Precision prevention

CITE THIS PAPER

YanRunYu Liang, ShiYu Xie. Goals and habits: local government governance model choice in China——comparative analysis of the prevent choice for the COVID-19. Eurasia Journal of Science and Technology. 2024, 6(5): 50-59. DOI: https://doi.org/10.61784/ejst3036.

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